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The concept of “social capital” has received considerable attention 
these years. Yet, few studies have explored the connections 
between social capital and bank risk-taking. In this study, I discuss 
the theory of social capital and its relevance to financial market 
behavior, and then I analyze the relationship between social 
capital and bank risk-taking across countries. To measure social 
capital, I follow Knack and Keefer (1997) and use the data of trust 
and civic norms collected from the World Values Survey. My 
measure of bank risk-taking is the nature logarithm of Z-score of 
each bank. Empirical results show that bank risk-taking is lower in 
countries where social capital is higher. It is also shown that the 
impact of social capital is stronger when the level of education in 
the country is lower. This paper investigates the negative impact of 
social capital on non-performing loan as well. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The financial system of the recipient country plays an important role of its 
economic growth. Schumpeter recognized the importance of well-developed 
financial intermediaries on economic development almost a century ago. In a 
nutshell, the argument goes that well-functioning financial markets, by 
lowering costs of conducting transactions, ensure capital is allocated to the 
projects that yield the highest returns, and therefore, enhance growth rates. 
From 1980s, there was a profusion of banking crises in a variety of countries. 
Japan suffered the largest losses at that time, with official estimates putting 
non-performing loans in 1995 at about $400 billion (unofficial estimates reach 
$1 trillion, or about 25 percent of GDP)1. Argentina in the early 1980s likely 
saw the largest relative loss (estimated variously at 20-55 percent of GDP). 
U.S. suffered the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 2007 and 
ensuing financial instability. These cases attracted economists to banking 
insolvency issues. Caprio, Derard, and Klingebiel (1996) analyze the factors 
that have caused bank insolvency, and how governments have responded. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Dtragiache (2002) find the relation between the existence 
of explicit deposit insurance and the likelihood of banking crises. Boyd, 
DeNicolo, and Loukoianova (2009) study the formulate a theoretical model of 
a banking industry, and use both country-level and firm-level samples to 
examine the impacts of macroeconomic factors, market structure, deposit 
insurance, and external shocks on the likelihood of banking crisis. 
A growing literature demonstrates the linkage between the regulatory 
architecture, political environment and financial market. Kim and Santomero 
                                                              
1  Data Source: Caprio, G., & Klingebiel, D., 1996. Bank insolvency: bad luck, bad policy, or bad banking? Annual 
World Bank conference on development economics (Vol. 79). Washington: The World Bank. 
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(1988) investigate the role of bank capital regulation in risk control using the 
mean-variance model. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
examine the link laws governing investor protection, the quality of 
enforcement of laws, and ownership concentration, with financial market. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the relation between bank stability and 
bank regulations on bank activities depends on each bank’s ownership 
concentration. Houston, Lin, Ma (2011) find that strong protection and limited 
regulation can help attract international bank flow with a sample of 
international bank flows from 26 source countries to 120 recipient countries 
over a few decades.  
Meanwhile, the concept of “social capital” has received considerable attention 
these years. There is even a World Bank’s workshop – social capital: 
Integrating the Economist’s and the Sociologist’s Perspectives held in 1997. 
Some scholars began to concern the effect of social capital on global 
economic growth and industry growth. La Porta et al. (1996) document a 
remarkable correlation between the trust prevailing in a country and the 
presence of large organizations, and find that trust is lower in countries with 
dominant hierarchical religions. Knack and Keefer (1997) find trust and civic 
norms are stronger in the countries with faster economic growth. Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) examine the role of social capital in financial 
development. 
More literatures study the effect of the social structure of individuals or small 
groups on economic outcomes. Besley and Coate (1995) relate social 
collateral to group lending programs; Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) study the 
relationship between social interaction and sock market participation. 
Yet, few existing studies have explored the connections between social 
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capital and banking market, especially for the social capital of the whole 
community. Zingales et al. (2004), one of few studies that investigate the 
connection between social capital and financial market, pays more attentions 
on the households’ choice, and the data used are limited in Italy. In my paper, 
I investigate the relationship between social capital and bank risk-taking. My 
main motivation is to advance a neglected theoretical position. It is also my 
main contribution to the literature. 
My second motivation of this paper is to test whether social capital at the 
country level is unambiguously good. Previous studies suggest that the social 
capital within a small group will bring both benefits and costs to the group and 
the social capital across groups only have positive effects (Guiso, Sapienza, 
Zingales, 2004). However, I argue that people may be over confident and 
make a decision careless because of the high social capital in the whole 
country, and the ratio of non-performing loan will be higher in high social 
capital countries. 
Since there is no unique definition of social capital, the measures of social 
capital aren’t uniform either. In my research, I mainly study the social 
connection across at the community level and not in any subgroup. Based on 
the methodology of Knack and Keefer (1997), I use the response from the 
World Value Survey in the 2005 wave to capture the level of social capital in a 
country. Both trust and civic norm are used as the indicators of social capital. 
Trust is across 51 countries and Civic is across 53 countries. 
To examine bank risk-taking, I use the Z-score of each bank, which indicates 
the probability of bankruptcy and is widely used in the empirical banking 
literature. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), I use the natural logarithm of 
the Z-score instead of the raw Z-score, since the raw Z-score is highly skewed 
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(see, Figure 1). Totally, 2093 banks from 161 countries are included in the 
sample. 
My main finding shows that social capital has positive relationship with bank 
stability. When the country-level mean of education is low, the effect of trust 
may be stronger. As my empirical result showing, social capital may increase 
the percentage of non-perform loan by gross loan as well. It means there are 
both a “bright” side and a “dark” side to social capital. In high social capital 
area, banks are farther away from bankruptcy, but they will get more 
non-performing loan because of the high confidence of the whole society and 
careless decision. To do the robustness test, I use the subsample which 
excludes the banks in U.S.A. and the results is similar to the main regression, 
indicating the both trust and civic norms have positive effects on bank stability. 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the literature review on 
the factors which may influence bank risk-taking, the theories of social capital, 
and the measures of bank risk-taking and social capital. Chapter 3 develops 
the hypotheses about how social capital affects bank risk-taking. Chapter 4 
introduces the data source, and summarizes dependent and independent 
variables. Chapter 5 describes empirical results. Chapter 6 concludes and 
concerned some further extensions of this study. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter provides the literature review both on the bank risk-taking and 
social capital. I show the studies about the impacts of other important 
variables on bank risk-taking. I discuss the definitions, the measures and the 
roles of social capital as well. Both these two parts are meaningful to the 
hypotheses that I present in Chapter 3 and the model that I formulate in 
Charter 5. 
2.1 The Factors Influencing Bank Risk-Taking 
Before the nineteenth century, government safety nets were uncommon. 
However, at the end of the twentieth century government intervention (before 
and especially after episodes of bank insolvency) has become commonplace, 
suggesting a belief that bank solvency is important. Economists have also 
been interested in this issue and tested which factors influence the likelihood 
of bankruptcy from that time.  
According to Boyd, Runkle (1993) and DeNicoló (2000) study that bank size is 
an important factor which influences bank risk of failure, I include it in my 
model. These are some different theories about the relationship between 
bank size and bank risk. Some studies predict that large firms can get 
size-related diversification benefits, economies of scale and are less likely to 
fail than smaller ones. However another theory supports that since the 
large-banks are viewed as more likely to result in macroeconomic 
externalities, they are more likely to be instable and to fail. Boyd and Runkle 
(1993) suggest that there is no support for an inverse relationship between 
bank size and bank stability and prove it with an annual data over 1971-1990 
from COMPUSTAT. DeNicoló (2000) also indicates that medium–to–large 
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banks don’t get the benefits above and take higher risk through a sample of 
publicly traded banks in 21 countries over 1988-1998. Houston, Lin, Lin and 
Ma (2010) find an inverse U-shape relationship between bank size and 
risk-taking when they examine the relationship between creditor rights and 
bank risk-taking. In my paper, my results support the later opinion. Although 
the coefficients of bank size in my regressions are not all significant, they are 
all negative, which implying the larger size of banks tends to increase the risk 
of banks. 
Competition is also one of important control variables in my regressions. Like 
size, economists have different ideas about the relationship between market 
concentration and bank stability. If banks with greater market power tend to 
charge higher interest rates to firms to gain more returns, banks may induce 
firms to assume greater risk and then banks’ own risk-taking become higher. 
To this extent, the concentration is positively associated with banks enjoying 
greater market power. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), DeNicoló et al. (2004), 
Dick (2006) provides some evidence to prove this idea. However, some 
economists object this idea. Keeley (1990) argues that increases in 
competition caused bank charter values to decline, to increase banks’ asset 
risk and reduce capital holdings and then increase the probability of 
bankruptcy. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) have similar result, 
arguing that the concentration ratio is negatively related with the likelihood of 
a banking crisis. I use HHI as an index of market concentration, and find the 
relationship between concentration rate and bank stability is positive but not 
significant. The result of Boyd, DeNicoló and Jalal (2006) may explain why my 
result is not significant. They consider there is no empirical evidence to 
support that concentration ratio is positively associated with banks’ probability 
of failure, and that the relationship between market concentration and bank 
risk depends on which model the market structure and the way of competition 
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are similar to. Since I analyze the impact of social capital across different 
countries, and different banking markets may work as different financial 
models, the impact of market concentration in my sample may play different 
role across different countries which leads to the non-significant coefficients. 
Besides bank’s characteristics and market concentration, national regulation 
and macro-environment also affect the performance of banks and, of course, 
affect bank risk-taking as well. It is easy to understand, healthy and stable 
macroeconomic environment is good for bank to develop, so I conclude 
macroeconomic factors – inflation and GDP per capita as macro-environment 
controls. Meanwhile, advanced legal system can limit bank to take too high 
risk asset and avoid contract violation, efficient social network will help bank 
to get true information about firms and make a smart decision. According to 
Calomiris (2008), Maddaloni and Peydro (2010), I include indicator of capital 
regulation to my model. However, as Kim and Santomero (1988) demonstrate 
that simple capital regulation isn’t effective enough to control the probability of 
bank insolvency, other regulation controls should be used in reality. I include 
diversification index, official supervisory power and provisioning stringency to 
control the impact of nation bank regulation, with the database from Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2006), which was also used by Laeven and Levine (2009) 
and Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma (2010).  
Some economists consider that deposit insurance leads to relatively high cost 
and incentive effects (moral hazard) and increases bank risk-taking. Keeley 
(1990), Demirguc-Kunt, Dtragiache (2002) and Laeven (2002) support this 
idea and analyze empirical evidence with panel data. The first deposit 
insurance system was established in the U.S. in 1934 -- after the Great 
Depression to protect bank depositors. However, depositors monitor banks to 
take relatively high risk since they feel safe because of protection of deposit 
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insurance. The incentive is due to a payoff structure in which large gains go to 
bank shareholders and large losses to the government. On the other hand, 
the cost of insuring also gives banks the pressure to increase their risk-taking 
to pursue high return. And the effect of deposit insurance becomes stronger 
when bank interest rates have been deregulated and when the institutional 
environment is weak as a result of limited moral hazard. However, Gorton and 
Rosen (1995) test the data for large U.S. banks during 1980s and argue that 
the effect of moral hazard as a result of deposit insurance was not a 
significant problem, and increase risk slightly. And my empirical results seem 
to prove the last idea. 
2.2 The Measure of Bank Risk-Taking 
The literature on bank risk-taking includes different measures of bank risk. For 
example, Anderson and Fraser (1999) measure the standard deviation of the 
bank’s daily returns and the stock price volatility, Salas and Saurina (2003) 
use the proportion of loan losses over total loans as an indicator of bank risk, 
Gonzalez (2005) and Jimenez, Lopez, Saurina (2010) use the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total bank loans as a measure of bank risk-taking. 
Since what I am interested in is the risk of bankruptcy, I analyze the effect of 
social capital on bank risk-taking by using the z-score of each bank, as 
measured by return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of asset returns. The Z-score is a measure of bank stability 
and indicates the likelihood of bank insolvency and has been widely used in 
the empirical bank risk-taking literature. Boyd, Runkle (1993), DeNicoló 
(2000), Boyd, DeNicoló, Jalal (2006), Laeven, Levine (2009); Houston, Lin, 
Lin, Ma (2010) all utilize Z-score as a measure of bank risk. 
Based on these studies, I include bank size, too-big-to-fail, loan loss reserves, 
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market concentration ratio, deposit insurance coverage and national bank 
regulation as control variables and add another important factor – social 
capital as the key variable to analyze what will affect the risk of bank. Based 
on previous researches, I use the nature logarithm of Z-score to test the 
distance of insolvency of each bank. 
2.3 The Concept of Social Capital 
Social capital became a hot topic in the end of last century, and a lot of 
literatures study the function of social capital. Scholars define or follow 
different concepts of social capital according to the topic or field they want to 
analyze. 
The term of social capital was initially coined in sociology. Jacobs (1961) may 
be the first one to identify social capital, and he depicts social capital as 
“neighborhood networks”. Bourdieu (1985) defines social capital as the 
advantages and opportunities accruing to people through membership in 
certain communities. Coleman (1990) refers social capital as resource of 
individuals that emerges from social ties. Burt (2009) defines social capital as 
“the resources contacts possess and the structure of contacts in a network”.  
The concept of social capital has also been adopted and adapted by political 
scientists and economists. Putnam (1993) says that social capital is “feature 
life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared objectives”. Both Knack and Keefer (1997) 
and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) espouse this definition in their 
papers. In their view, social capital has value for the persons, who are in the 
same community, and both public and private will be influenced by its 
externalities. In my paper, I also follow Putnam’s definition, and refer social 
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capital as trust and civic norms that influence citizen’s behaviors. 
2.4 The Measures of Social Capital 
Generally, sociologists mainly study small groups, like families, and firms. 
Economists study large communities and nations, and focus on the level of 
social capital across groups, rather than within small groups. Because of the 
difference on understanding, they usually use different way to measure social 
capital. 
Coleman (1990) uses physical presence of adults, the number of siblings, 
mother’s expectation and the frequency of talking with parents about personal 
experiences to show the level of social capital in the family, the number of 
family moves and variation among the schools to show the social capital 
outside the family to test the effect of social capital on dropping out of school 
before graduation. Putnam (1995) measures social capital through electoral 
turnout, newspaper readership, participation in associations, and level of 
charity. Fukuyama (1995) equates trust with social capital. Knack and Keefer 
(1997) report an aggregate measure of trust and civic norms by country, 
derived from the World Values Survey (WVS). Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004) focus on the two measures: voter turnout for referenda and blood 
donations.  
Concerning that what I want to analyze is the impact of social capital on 
country level, the measures of social capital used by sociologists are not 
suitable for this research. And voter turnout, blood donations, and newspaper 
readership may influenced by laws or other requirements, it is difficult to tell 
the volunteer rate from the all sample. 
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2.5 The Role of Social Capital 
From Banfield’s book – “The Moral Basis of a Backward Society”, more and 
more economists recognize that social trust and other social network play an 
important role on economic performance, which had been ignored for a long 
time. For sociologists, they are more interested in how social capital affects 
the performance of a small group, as the drop rate of school, the cooperation 
in company. Economists are more interested in the role in big groups. Some 
focus on the effect of social capital on the growth of one industry, some 
interest in the influence of social capital on the development of economy.  
For firms’ growth, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silaries, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) and 
Fukuyama (1995) present that high level of trust helps increase the probability 
of becoming a large organization. Trust or social capital can reduce the 
asymmetry of information, produce socially efficient outcomes and to avoid 
inefficient non-cooperative traps such as that in the prisoners’ dilemma, and 
then be helpful to cooperation. This impact of social capital not only affects 
the presence of large company but also affects the safety of a firm, which I 
want test in this thesis. 
For financial market, social capital plays an important role in the degree of 
financial development. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) support this 
theory by the data across different parts of Italy. In high social capital area, the 
community’s networks provide better opportunity to punish deviants, the moral 
attitudes of a community is better, and the members of communities are more 
likely to trust other members to behave obeying the social norms. This 
indicates that the use and available of financial contracts is positively 
correlated with social capital. In my paper, I insist the this effect of social 
capital will influence the stability of bank as well, and as mentioned by Guiso, 
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Sapienza and Zingales (2004), the effect of social capital is stronger where 
citizens are averaged low educated.  
There are also a lot of researches about the role of social capital in global 
economy. Social capital may reduce the cost of written contracts substitute 
missing or expensive legal institutions, which is important for economy 
developing healthily and stably. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that the global 
income is higher and more equal in higher level of trust nation with the data 
from WVS. The correlation exists even after controlling for quality of 
governance. In my thesis, I add variables of quality of governance as 
additional control variable in Table 8. 
According to previous study, social capital can remarkably facilitate local 
financial development, encourage households to invest and make firms more 
likely to have multiple shareholders. What I expect to analyze is the impact of 
social capital on banks’ choice, especially on bank risk-taking. In my thesis, I 
find that higher social capital would be associated with lower bank risk-taking, 
higher level of bank stability. Because I am interested in the role of country 
level social capital rather than the social capital in any other subgroups. I 
follow Putnam’s definition of social capital, and apply trust and norms of civic 
cooperation to the term of social capital with WVS data as Knack and Keefer 
do, to test the role social capital on the bank stability. Since the surveys that 
Knack and Keefer used are relatively outdate, I choose the latest wave – 2005 
surveys. The questions about trust and civic cooperation in 2005 surveys are 
a little different the ones in 1981 surveys and in 1990 surveys, which are cited 
by Knack and Keefer. The question – “how much do you trust the people you 
meet for the first time” is used to assess the level of trust. And three of the 
questions which Knack and Keefer consider as assessments of civic 
cooperation are used in my paper to create the indicator of civic norms. To 
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examine whether the effect of social capital is stronger in the area with lower 
education, the constraint – education is also cited. 
In the next chapter I develop the hypotheses, demonstrate the impacts of 
social capital on bank risk-taking and expect when the effect of social capital 
is stronger.  
14 
 
Chapter 3 Hypotheses 
In the last chapter I reviewed the literature on the bank risk-taking and social 
capital, provided the background of them, showed different measures of these 
two items, introduced some factors may influence the bank risk-taking, and 
pointed the importance of social capital to economy. This chapter I develop 
the hypotheses on the relationship between social capital and bank risk-taking 
based on the foundation in Chapter 2. 
3.1 Social Capital and Bank Risk-Taking 
The main business of a commercial bank is gaining deposit and providing 
loans. It is something that provides of a sum of money today for a promise to 
get back money in the future. This exchange is a trust-sensitive transaction 
and will take place relying on not only the legal enforceability of contracts, but 
also upon the trust between the borrowers and lenders. Putnam (1993) refers 
social capital as networks, norms, and trust in one community or nation. Since 
trust among the members in a community is an important part of social capital 
in this community, social capital should affect both the behavior of borrowers 
and the behavior of lenders, as trust do. 
Hypothesis 1: 
In the country with higher social capital, the probability of insolvency of banks 
should be lower. 
To borrowers, social capital may increase the cost of violation and then 
reduce the ratio of contract violation, finally reduce the risk of bank. If trust is 
an equilibrium outcome of a society (see Coleman (1990) and Spagnolo 
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(1999)), each firm will make its efforts to obey contracts as a result of high 
cost of violation in high social capital area. In high social capital area, firms 
operate more relying on social interactions. So when one firm betray its 
contracts, what it loss is really more than the expense it should pay as the law 
ruled. On the other hand, if trust is a moral attitude (see Banfield (1958)), each 
firm will limit its behavior as a result of its staff’s moral attitude. In high social 
capital country, CEO, managers of a firm are educated to keep their promise, 
and behaving as moral norms has a larger coefficient in their utility function so 
banks are facing less risk of violation of contract. 
To lenders, social capital may reduce the cost of financial contracts, improve 
the efficiency of cooperate which may increase banks’ profit, help banks to go 
over the troubles and avoid bankruptcy. When the social capital in a group is 
high enough, written contracts may become relatively unimportant and 
inessential. High social capital will reduce the cost of employing lawyers and 
the time paying on understanding complex contracts. As the example showed 
in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), Jewish diamond merchants in New 
York do their business without written contracts as a result of the extremely 
high social capital in their community. In financial industry, labor cost and cost 
of time are so high. If a bank can save labor and time from the establishing 
contracts, it could reduce its interest rate, which will reduce the risk of firms, 
and then reduce its own risk. Since high levels of social capital are associated 
with high levels of social interaction and high social cooperation induces 
people less selfish, more public – spirited, and lower levels of economic 
instability by repeated interaction (Rodrik, 2000), the cooperation inside banks 
and among banks and firms will be more efficient and the profit should be 
higher in the higher social capital area, which reduce the probability of 
insolvency.  
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Meanwhile, Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma (2010) claim that information sharing 
can increase bank profitability and the growth of economy, and reduce bank 
risk-taking. And social capital may increase the quantity and quality of 
information, which help banks to analyze the performance of firms and solve 
information asymmetry problem. In the areas with high levels of social 
interaction, information circulates more frequently, reducing the asymmetry of 
information among financial markets. In Lin (1999), social ties can provide 
useful information about opportunities and choices in the usual imperfect 
market situations. High social capital helps managers of banks to make right 
decisions and know the firms better. In low social capital country, the risk of 
bank should be higher than the one in high social capital country.  
Hypothesis 2: 
The percentage of non-performing loans divided by gross loans is higher if 
there is more social capital. 
Except the role of social capital on the distance of bank insolvency listed 
above, some negative effects of social capital on the behavior of lenders may 
exist as well.  
When the managers of banks make decision about providing loans, they may 
be over confident in their partners and decide careless as a result of high 
social capital. In high social capital area, banks are always facing the firms 
which obey the contracts. This recognition may influence the judgment of a 
bank and let mangers of banks classify poor performance assets to normal or 
good assets. Meanwhile, as Banfield’s (1958) and Fukuyama’s (1995) claim, 
in the low social capital areas, transactions take place more within narrow 
subgroups such as families and friends who they know better. For banks, they 
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may only provide loans to the firms they have already operated with, and 
know the performance of firms well through some private channels. Banks will 
reduce the non-performing loan ratio because of this careful and narrow 
choice in these low social capital areas.  
Although the ratio of non-performing loan is one of the indicators of bank risk, 
it is still theoretically possible that lower probability of insolvency and higher 
ratio of non-performing loan exist simultaneously if the bank earns extra 
profits from the performing loans and/or other invest products that are more 
than to offset the losses caused by non-performing loans. In addition, banks 
still get benefits from high social capital, by reducing costs, improving the 
efficiency of cooperation and solving information asymmetry issue, the 
probability of insolvency should be lower in high social capital area, which is 
consistent with hypothesis 1. 
To conclude, the likelihood of insolvency of a bank may decline because of 
high social capital by low cost of contracts, efficient cooperation, high 
information circulation, but the effect of social capital on non-performing loan 
ratio may be negative. 
3.2 When Does Social Capital Matter More? 
So far I have implicitly assumed that the social capital is important in bank 
risk-taking. The importance of social capital may be different across different 
countries. The role of social capital of shareholders’ countries is what I am 
interested in as well. 
Hypothesis 3: 
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In the countries with a low averaged education, the impacts of trust and civic 
norms on bank risk-taking are stronger. 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show the effect of social capital on the 
financial development is stronger where among less-education people. As 
their claim, it is impossible for the persons with less-education to fully grasp all 
the details of the contract involved, and it is hard for them to discriminate 
between legitimate investments and frauds. Of course, it is also difficult for 
persons with less-education to analyze the risk of assets. No matter for banks 
or for firms, risk control will become more rely on the social capital rather than 
technical analysis or sophisticated regulation. The impact of social capital, 
especially for the impact of trust, should be stronger where the country level 
education is lower. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The impact of social capital from the shareholders’ country is much lower than 
the impact of social capital from registration country. 
The level of social capital of the area in which one person lives, regardless of 
the one in which he was born influences his behavior (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2004)). Coleman (1990) considers trust as an equilibrium 
outcome of a society, each individual choose obey his promise or not depends 
on the punishment if he betray what he should do. Since the punishment he 
will face is driven by the level of social interactions where he lives, managers 
and CEOs of firm behave reflecting the level of social capital in where the 
firms are located rather than the one in where they were from or the 
shareholders were from. As Banfield (1958) points that trust is a moral attitude 
imprinted with education, the level of social capital of the place where an 
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individual grew up will affect him more than the level of social capital of the 
province of birth will. Firms’ and banks’ behaviors reflect their staff’s moral 
attitude. Although bank shareholders’ moral attitudes also influence the 
behaviors of a bank, the impact should be indirectly and less strong as the 
impact of majority of staff. 
All in all, banks tend to take less risk when there is more social capital. And 
the importance of social capital on bank risk-taking may be larger in areas 
where among less-educated people. Rather than the social capital in which 
the shareholders are from, the level of social capital in which the bank is 
located play an important role in bank risk-taking. 
3.3 Other important constrains and bank risk-taking 
According to the previous studies, banks are facing many important 
constraints suck as bank size, market competition and regulation. All of these 
constraints will influence their behaviors and lead to high or low level of risk. 
For a large bank, it may increase its interest rate to gain more return to 
maintain its operation. The high interest rate increases the risk of the firms 
getting loans from these banks. And large banks are easier influenced by 
macroeconomics. All in all, large bank tends to have higher risk. However, 
according to Houston, Lin, Lin, Ma (2010), the relationship between bank size 
and risk-taking may be non-linear. 
As argued by Keeley (1990) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003), 
bank may take more risk when the market competition is more fierce, since 
competition increase the pressure to get more market power and then take 
higher risk asset and reduce capital holdings. However, the impact of market 
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concentration may be not same in different markets pointed by Boyd, and 
DeNicoló (2006). It is not easy to present a hypothesis about market 
concentration. 
Generally saying, national bank regulations will limit the risk-taking of each 
bank, and reduce the probability of crisis. But the roles of bank regulations are 
also influenced by other bank characteristics or are not effective enough 
sometimes (Laeven and Levine (2009), Kim and Santomero (1988)).  
And the role of deposit insurance is also complicated, it should be safety net 
of bank crisis as the motivation of the establishment of it, but it may be bad 
factor to bank safety as a result of moral hazard mentioned by Keeley (1990), 
Demirguc-Kunt, Dtragiache (2002) and Laeven (2002). 
In Chapter 4, I will describe the data source, dependent variables, key control 
variables, and also other control variables. 
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Chapter 4 Data and Variables 
In the last chapter I developed the hypotheses on the relation between bank 
risk-taking and social capital, the impact of social capital on non-performing 
loans, when the effects of social capital are stronger and whether the social 
capital of the shareholders’ country is important as well. In this chapter, I will 
describe the data sources, dependent variables and the control variables. 
4.1 Data Sources 
The data used in this thesis are compiled from three main sources: 
(1) Bank-level accounting information for about 2000 banks is obtained from 
the BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings. The 
BankScope database has comprehensive coverage in most countries, 
accounting for over 90% of all banking assets in each country. Every bank 
report includes detailed spreadsheet data -- a balance sheet and income 
statement totaling up to 200 data items and 36 pre-calculated financial ratios 
up to 16 years. It also contains ownership information (shareholders and 
subsidiaries). In my paper, I use the data from 1999 to 2006; 
(2) The World Value Survey (WVS) is a worldwide network of social scientists 
studying changing values and their impact on social and political life. The 
WVS is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change, and 
conducted by a network of social scientist at leading universities all around 
world. It has executed five waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007.  I use the 
last wave: 2005. 73322 observations about trust in 2005 from 51 countries 
and 75766 observations about civic norms in 2005 from 53 countries can be 
obtained. 
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(3) The Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) data indicate that restrictions on the 
entry of new banks, government ownership of banks, and restrictions on bank 
activities hurt banking system performance. The database is based on a world 
bank survey in 152 countries over 1999-2007. Country-level bank regulation 
variables are compiled from it. 
In addition to the three databases above, other data sources as following are 
relied on in my study as well. They supply the data for one or two control 
variables in my model. 
To control macroeconomic environment, variables, such as logarithm of GDP 
per capita, logarithm of GDP and inflation rate are included. These data is 
obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI). The primary World 
Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially-recognized 
international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global 
development data available, and includes national, regional and global 
estimates.  
The deposit insurance coverage data, one of country-level control variables, 
across 89 countries over the time period 1960-2004 are obtained from the 
comprehensive deposit insurance database edited by Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, 
and Laeven (2008). 
When I examine the regressions with additional control variables, I use the 
worldwide governace indicators (WGI) from Kaufmann, Karray and Mastuzzi 
(2009). It is a database about the quality of governance across about 200 
countries2. 
                                                              
2  Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009).    "The Worldwide Governance Indicators : A 
Summary of Methodology. The data is also available at www.govindicators.org. 
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Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all of the key variables. The 
definitions of variables are listed in Table A. 
The correlation matrix in Table 1b and Table 1c show that banks take less risk 
when trust and/ or civic norms are higher. These two tables show that Z-score 
and national regulation of provisioning are positively correlated with a 
statistically significant, while the positive correlation between Z-score and log 
GDP per capita is also statistically significant. 
4.2 Dependent Variable – bank risk-taking 
I measure bank risk-taking using the Z-score of each bank, as measured by 
return on assets (ROA) plus the capital-asset ratio (CAR) divided by the 
standard deviation of asset returns (σ(ROA)). The z-score is a measure of 
bank stability and indicates the distance from insolvency and has been widely 
used in the empirical banking and finance literature after Roy’s study in 1952. 
The definition of a bank Insolvency is when losses surmount equity. The 
probability of insolvency, therefore, can be expressed as prob (-ROA<CAR), 
where ROA is the return on assets and CAR is the capital assets ratio. If 
profits are normally distributed, then the inverse of the probability of 
insolvency equals (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of ROA (Laeven, Levine，2009). Z-score is monotonically associated 
with a bank’s stability, and a higher Z-score means the bank is more stable. 
Since the Z-score is highly skewed, I use the natural logarithm of the Z-score 
as the risk indicator. For brevity, I use the label “Z-score” in referring to the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score in the remainder of this thesis.  
The main sample is a cross-country data for one period, around 2005, and is 
composed of 2,093 commercial banks across 161 countries over the period 
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from 2004 to 2006 from the BankScope database. The ROA and CAR are 
therefore calculated as the mean over 2004 – 2006, and σ(ROA) is the 
standard deviation of ROA estimated over the time periods 2004 – 2006. The 
mean of Z-score is 3.647, the minimum is -2.806 and the maximum is 9.636. 
The standard deviation is 1.324. These summary statistics are similar to those 
reported by Houston, Lin, Lin, Ma (2010); in looking at a longer period sample 
(average over 2000 –2007), they report a mean Z-score of 3.240 and a 
standard deviation of 1.086. As they indicate the fairly high standard deviation 
and the wide range in Z-score imply that there is considerable 
cross—sectional variation in the level of bank risk. 
4.3 Independent Variable – social capital 
As I have mentioned, the indicator I use is the responses to the question 
about trust from the World Value Survey (WVS). The question used for Trust 
in 2005 survey is: how much do you trust the people you meet for the first time. 
Let the level – “trust completely” equals to 1, “somewhat” equals to 0.67, “not 
very much” equals to 0.33, and “not trust at all” equals to 0. The trust indicator 
is the average score of respondents in each nation (after deleting no 
responses). 73322 observations from 51 countries can be obtained. Since 
Inglehart (1994) argue that some groups, such as city—dwellers and the 
better—educated are oversampled in some countries, I follow Knack and 
Keefer (1997) using the weight variable provided in the data in computing 
country—level means. Then the trust indicator of 2005 covering 51 countries 
can be obtained, with a mean of 0.394 and a standard deviation of 0.064. 
Larger values indicate higher level of trust. 
To create the indicator of civic norms, the question about whether each of the 
following behaviors “can always be justified, never be justified or something in 
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between” is used.3 
1) “claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to” 
2) “avoiding a fare on public transport” 
3) “cheating on taxes if you have the chance” 
Respondents chose a number from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always 
justifiable). To let the values positively related with civic cooperation, these 
scales are reversed and summed over the three items to create an index – 
Civic with a 30-point maximum. Of course, the weight variable is also used as 
Trust. Then Civic cover 53 countries, with a mean of 24.070 and a standard 
deviation of 1.219. Larger values indicate higher level of social capital. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) indicate that nonrandom samples, translation 
problems, and discrepancies between professed attitudes and actual 
behaviors do not introduce severe noise into this measure of trust by testing 
the correlation between this trust indicator with the result of other famous 
experiments conducted by the Reader’s Digest (as reported in The Economist, 
June 22, 1996). Some wallets containing some cash and the addresses and 
phone numbers of their “owner” were “accidentally” dropped in twenty cities 
from fourteen different western European countries and twelve U.S. cities. 
The percentage of wallets returned with their contents intact in each country is 
highly correlated with “Trust” at 0.67. This evidence indicates these 
survey-based measures of social capital are reasonable. 
                                                              
3  In Knack and Keefer’s work, other two behaviors: “keeping money that you have found” and “failing to report 
damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle” are also consider to assess the strength of norms of civic 
cooperation. Since these two behaviors are not included in 2005 surveys, they are not used in this thesis either. 
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And Knack and Keefer (1997) also argue that the relatively low correlation 
with trust in family members show that trust in a country is primarily capturing 
“generalized” trust as opposed to “specific” trust placed in people one has 
close and frequent interactions with, like relatives and friends. What I want 
analyze is the effect of country-level social capital but not the trust within a 
subgroup, so I choose the question about the trust to the person meet first 
time rather than to the family or friend to create the indicator of generalized 
trust. 
I find that the standard deviation of Civic is relatively lower, compared with the 
one of Trust. The reason may be that respondents are more likely to be 
reluctant to admit the behaviors as cheating the government, taxpayers and 
avoiding the fare on public transport so that the variation across countries 
becomes low. This problem may introduce measurement error into Civic, so I 
use Trust as primary indicator but report results using both measures. 
Using 2005’s data have two advantages. First, the data of 2005 shows the 
extent of trust more precisely since the answer contains four different level of 
trust instead of two. Second, the 2005 data is much more updated and across 
more countries than previous data which are usually used by previous 
literature. On the other hand, data from BankScope just cover the period over 
1997 to 2013, and substantial data of return on asset are missing in the early 
year which limits the sample of banks. Meanwhile, I cannot assume trust and 
civic norms of all countries are consistent especially after big events like 
financial crisis in 1997, Iraq War in 2003. So I just test the data around 2005 
and do not test any panel regression. 
4.4 Other Country-level Control Variables 
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Besides social capital, a large number of country characteristics play a role on 
bank risk-taking. This paper controls for banking national regulation, market 
concentration, and macro-environment.  
As measures of banking regulation, I examine Capital regulatory index, 
Diversification index, Official supervisory power, Provisioning stringency, and 
Deposit insurance coverage. The first five variables are from the banking 
regulation database compiled by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). The last 
one is obtained from Demirguc – Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2008). 
Capital regulatory index is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital. 
This measure takes into account whether the minimum required 
capital-to-asset ratio conform to the Basle guidelines; whether the minimum 
ratio vary with market risk; whether the market value of loan losses deducted 
from reported accounting capital; whether unrealized losses in the securities 
portfolio and unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted from reported 
accounting capital; whether initial and subsequent infusions of regulatory 
capital include assets other than cash or government securities; whether the 
initial infusion of capital be based on borrowed funds; and whether the 
sources of funds that count as regulatory capital verified by the regulatory or 
supervisory authorities. It is range from 3 to 10, and its mean is 6.144. Higher 
values indicate greater stringency. 
Diversification index includes the information on whether explicit, verifiable, 
and quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification; whether banks prohibited 
from making loans abroad; and whether a minimum liquidity requirement 
exists. The mean of diversification index is 1.778, and the standard deviation 
is 0.432, with the range from 0 to 2. A higher value indicates greater liquidity 
and more bank asset diversification. 
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Official supervisory Power is an index showing whether the supervisory 
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems. This variable is based upon yes or no responses to 16 questions, 
including: whether supervisors meet with any external auditors to discuss their 
reports without bank approval; whether auditors are legally required to report 
any misconduct by managers or directors to the supervisory authorities; 
whether the supervisory authorities have the right to take legal action against 
external auditors for negligence, or force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure and order a bank’s directors / mangers to provide 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses; whether the deposit insurance 
agency can take legal action against bank directors or officers; whether 
off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the supervisory authorities; whether 
failure to abide by a cease-desist type order lead to the automatic imposition 
of civil and penal sanctions on the directors and managers of a bank; whether 
the supervisory authorities can suspend the directors’ decision to distribute 
dividends, bonuses, or management fees; whether the supervisory authorities 
can supercede shareholder rights and declare a bank insolvent; whether the 
supervisory authorities can suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem 
bank; regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, whether the 
supervisory authorities can supercede shareholder rights, remove and 
replace management, or remove and replace directors. A higher value 
indicates more power. It is range from 4 to 14, with the mean of 12.158 and 
the standard deviation of 1.788. 
Provisioning stringency measures the sum of the minimum required 
provisioning percentages when a loan is successively classified as 
sub-standard, doubtful, and loss, with higher values indicating more 
stringency. The mean is 168.515, and the standard deviation is 23.996. 
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Deposit insurance coverage is the ratio of deposit insurance coverage to 
deposits per capita. Data are obtained from the comprehensive deposit 
insurance database edited by Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2008). The 
mean of deposit insurance coverage is 3.359 across 76 countries. The 
standard deviation is 23.544. 
Regarding the banking market concentration, I examine 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, using the CR4 as a robust test during the 
analysis of the relationship between social capital and non-performing loan.  
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the sum of the squared shares of 
bank deposits to total deposits within a given country. CR4 is equal to the sum 
of the deposits of the four largest banks to total deposits within a given country. 
I calculated these two variables from the BankScope database and averaged 
over 2004 – 2006. Higher values indicate higher concentration and lower level 
competition. 
I also test other country – level data as macro-environment control variables: 
the natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and inflation 
rate (GDP deflator). All these data are from the WDI, and averaged from 2004 
to 2006. Inflation is obtained with a mean of 5.118 across 172 countries, and 
Log GDP per capita is obtained with a mean of 10.026 across 172 countries. 
In Table 8, I use some governance indicators as additional controls, such as 
political stability, quality of regulation, control of corruption as well. Political 
stability measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown. Quality of regulation measures the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations. 
Control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised 
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for private gain and private interests. The value of year 2005 is used in this 
thesis. Higher value indicates better governance performance. 
4.5 Other Bank-level control variables 
I also control for several bank – level variables: bank size, too-big-to-fail, and 
loan loss reserve. Bank size is the logarithm of total bank assets in US dollars, 
averaged over the period 2004 – 2006. Too-big-to-fail is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 
10%, averaged over the period 2004 – 2006. Loan loss reserve is the 
percentage of loan loss reserves divided by total loans, averaged over the 
period 2004 – 2006. 
This chapter provides the data sources, describes the summary statistics of 
the data, and shows the measures of independent variables and control 
variables. The next chapter will present the model and report the empirical 
results. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis 
In last chapter, I summarized the data sources, definitions and measures of 
bank risk-taking, social capital, and other control variables. In this chapter, I 
describe econometric methodology, test the hypotheses mentioned in the 
Chapter 3 and explain the regression results. 
5.1 Main Model 
My mainly regression model is expressed as follows: 
Zij = α+β1 X1j+β2 X2ij+β3 X3j+εij 
where the i and j subscripts indicate bank and country respectively. Zij is log 
Z-score; α is a constant; εij is the random disturbance term; X1 refers to the 
key variable: Trust or Civic. X2 is a vector of bank level control variables, 
including bank size, too-big-to-fail, the rate of loan loss reserves; and X2 is a 
vector of country level control variables, including market concentration, 
inflation, log GDP per capita, deposit insurance coverage, and bank national 
regulations – diversification index, capital regulation, official supervisory 
power, and provisioning stringency. 
Table 2a and Table 2b present the result of the relation between social capital 
and bank risk-taking. The sample contains about 2000 banks across almost 
20 countries. Key variables: trust and civic are from 2005 surveys of WVS. 
Dependent variable – Z-score and other control variables are from 
BankScope averaged over 2004-2006. Totally, I have four model 
specifications in Table 2. Model 1 is a simple OLS regression between bank 
risk-taking and social capital without putting any control variables. In Model 2, 
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3 and 4, I include groups of bank-level, industry-level and country-level control 
variables one by one. No matter which model specification I consider, the 
main results remain unchanged. In Table 2a, I can observe that there is a 
positive significant impact from Trust on the degree of bank risk-taking. 
Moreover, the results hold even when we replace Trust by Civic to represent 
the social capital (see Table 2b). However, the impact of Civic on the degree 
of bank risk-taking is relatively small in comparison with that of Trust, which 
may be due to the problem of calculation procedure. In sum, our empirical 
results fulfill our hypothesis in Chapter 3: the social capital can exert a positive 
and significant effect on the distance of bank insolvency. Since social capital 
may reduce the rate of violation of contracts, low the cost of financial 
contracts, increase the quantity and quality of information, and improve the 
efficiency of cooperate. 
Banking crisis occurs when a large number of bank clienteles withdraw their 
deposits. The reason may be due to the strong belief that the bank might fail 
and become bankrupt. Based on our empirical results, we show that social 
capital could improve the degree of bank risk-taking, which means it improves 
the degree of safety of banks. Thus, countries with higher social capital would 
have the lower probability to witness a banking crisis. The high degrees of 
interpersonal trust would decrease the probability of withdraw from banks and 
finally decrease the probability of banking crisis. This reasoning may provide 
some implications for government and policy makers. To avoid the danger of 
banking crisis, it is better to improve the degree of social capital in the country, 
for example, construct a firm interpersonal network of people. 
Examining the coefficients on the various control variables, I find some 
additional results. Consistent with DeNicoló (2000), I find that bank size tends 
to lead to higher bank risk-taking no matter whether market concentration and 
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country level control variables are included in the model not. Meanwhile, more 
stringent minimum requirement about provisioning percentages is correlated 
with lower risk-taking. As might be expected, macro-environment variables 
have a significant and positive effect on bank stability. Banks tends to take 
lower risk in one country with higher GDP per capita. Both in Table 2a and 
Table 2b, the coefficients of market concentration index (HHI) not significant 
no matter whether country-level control variables are included. It implies the 
competition among the banks may not influence bank risk-taking significantly. 
As Boyd and DeNicoló (2006) argue, the impacts of market concentration are 
not always consistent. 
5.2 Subsample analysis: excluding banks in the United States 
Since the results may be heavily influenced by some large banks in a few key 
countries, subsample robustness test and weighted OLS regression are 
necessary.  
Firstly, concerning that the number of banks in the United States in the sample 
is the largest, I re-estimate the regressions after eliminating the data of banks 
in US as Houston, Lin, Lin, Ma (2010) do. Table 3a and Table 3b show the 
results of the impacts of trust and civic norms on bank risk-taking excluding 
banks in US respectively. As the main regressions, I include the different level 
control variables one by one. 
Consistent with the main regression, the impacts of trust and civic norms on 
bank risk-taking are significantly negative even after eliminating the banks in 
the United States. Higher trust or civic norms tend to low bank risk-taking. 
Larger bank size is correlated with higher risk-taking. And bank regulation 
indicator – provisioning stringency tends to limit bank risk-taking. 
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From the coefficients in Table 3a and Table 3b, I find another interesting result. 
After controlling all variables, I find that both the coefficients of trust and civic 
norms in Table 3 are larger than the ones in Table 2. It implies that the roles of 
trust and civic norms may not play well in US as in other countries. It seems 
that bankers in the United States should be more serious when they try to 
analyze the probability of bankruptcy or do other decisions. The expected 
“dark” side to social capital may be stronger in US. 
Secondly, I re-estimated the regressions weighted by total bank assets. To 
double robustness check, I also examine the results using the indicators of 
trust and civic norms without weighted by the Weight variable provided by 
WVS. No matter how I change the weight, the coefficients of Trust and Civic 
are still significantly negative. In fact, the key coefficients in robustness check 
are even higher, and more significant. The coefficients of trust in the weighted 
OLS regression are even statistically different from zero at the 1% level. The 
coefficients of other variables – log GDP per capita and provisioning 
stringency remain similar to the main regressions. 
These results of robustness checks show that my conclusion about the 
relationship between social capital and bank risk-taking are reasonable and 
not driven by some large banks from a few key countries like the United 
States. 
5.3 Impact of Education 
According to Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), the effect of trust should 
be stronger among the persons with low level of education. In Table 4, I 
re-estimate the basic regression, using the sample of countries with relatively 
low education (education level in one country below the mean). To assess the 
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country level of education, the question “what is the highest educational level 
that you have attained?” is used. The answer should be chosen from the 
follow items: 
1) No formal education 
2) Incomplete primary school 
3) Complete primary school 
4) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
6) Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type 
7) Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 
8) Some university-level education, without degree 
9) University-level education, with degree 
After marking these responses from 1 to 9, I create an indicator of education 
as the country mean of the values. The mean value for education is 5.838867, 
and the standard deviation is 0.7620957. The indicator – Education cover 55 
countries. I also re-examine the indicators – Trust without weight variable 
provided by WVS as a robustness check. 
It is easy to conclude that the impact of trust is stronger when citizens in one 
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country have a low average education. If we check the coefficients in detail, 
we will find that the coefficients of almost all other control variables except 
HHI and diversification index become less significant while the coefficient of 
trust become more significant. And the coefficients of control variables – bank 
size, too big to fail, inflation, log GDP per capita, official supervisory power, 
provisioning stringency are smaller than the ones in main regression. 
Consistent with the expectation, when the country level education is low, 
banks behave more according to the social interaction rather than technical 
analysis. 
However, many scholars consider that trust is highly correlated with education 
(e.g. Coleman(1990), Helliwell and Putnam (1999)). In the countries with low 
education, the situations should be much worse than those in the countries 
with median or high education, since the level of trust is lower and the 
negative of low trust is stronger simultaneously. It implies that both the 
increase of the degree of social capital and the uplift of the education level are 
important for bank stability. 
5.4 social capital and non-performing loan 
As I mentioned in the Chapter 3, social capital can be both a “good” and a 
“bad”, especially for trust. For the firms and consumers, they may try more to 
obey the contracts because of their moral attitude or the close interaction with 
banks, which are part of elements of social capital. However, for the bankers, 
they may be over confident to receive the returns of loans and make a 
decision carelessly since they trust others. Moreover, there may be a moral 
hazard that some bad – performing firms perhaps take advantage of the trust 
within one country to get loans from banks and escape their duty when they 
need return money to the banks. To prove my hypotheses about the “dark” 
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side of trust, I estimate the effects of trust and civic norms on the percentage 
of non-preforming loans divided by total loans (NPL). To double confirm the 
bad impact of social capital, I replace HHI with CR4, another index of market 
concentration, as a robustness check. 
From Table 5, I conclude that trust has a significantly positive relationship with 
NPL. After replace HHI with CR4, the coefficient of trust is still positive and 
significant. Both the coefficients of Trust controlled by HHI and CR4 are 
statistically different from zero at either the 1%. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of Civic seem to be more relatively small 
compared by the coefficient of Trust4 and not so significant. Consistent with 
my hypotheses, the bad effect of social capital influence the bank risk-taking 
mainly through trust. I cannot reject the hypothesis that civic norms haven’t an 
effect on non-performing loan. Although I can’t conclude that NPL are 
absolutely independent on civic norms since the t-values of Civic are not too 
small and the regressions may be influenced by the sample error I have 
mentioned in the Chapter 4, I expect that the role of civic norms on NPL is not 
important as the role of trust, or that civic norms may really do not affect NPL. 
Moreover, I find that the high level diversification of each bank can reduce 
NPL. Since diversification index is an indicator showing whether there are 
explicit, verifiable, quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification and banks 
are allowed to make loans abroad, it implies that diversifying assets and 
making loans abroad may reduce the rate of NPL. 
5.5 social capital of shareholders country 
                                                              
4  In the model 4 of main regressions, the coefficient of Trust is 3.527 and the coefficient of Civic is 0.105 (about 
2.98% of 3.527). In the table 5, the coefficient of Trust control by HHI is 22.06 and the coefficient of Civic is 
0.0427 (about 1.94%); the coefficient of Civic control by CR4 is about 1.36% of the coefficient of Trust, which is 
much less than 2.98%.   
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To test the hypothesis that bank risk-taking is mainly affected by the social 
capital of the registration country rather than of the country where the 
shareholders are from, I replace the social capital of the biggest shareholder’s 
nation to the social capital of the registration country. 
I obtain the information about shareholder from BandScope database. Totally 
1831 banks information about their biggest shareholder’s country is obtained. 
I re-estimated regressions and present the results in Table 6. The coefficients 
of trust and civic norms are much smaller than the ones of model 4 in main 
regressions. And the coefficients are even not significant any more, which 
prove my hypothesis 4. It shows that the social capital of shareholders’ 
country don’t affect the behaviors of banks significantly. That means that 
banks won’t be safer or more dangerous just as a result of changing the 
biggest shareholder regardless of other environmental and individual 
characteristics. 
To further robustness check my results, I replace bank size with bank size 
squared concerning previous literature show the impact of bank size may be 
nonlinear. All results are presented in Table 7. Model 1 to model 4 in Table 7 
show the coefficients of Trust and Civic is still significantly positive even 
concerning nonlinear problem of bank size. Model 5 and model 6 in Table 7 
suggest that the impact of trust is stronger among low educated people even 
after concerning the possibility that the impact of bank size on bank risk in 
nonlinear. Model 7 to model 10 in Table 7 document that social capital may 
increase the percentage of NPL while it reduces the probability of bankruptcy, 
and that the negative impact of social capital works mainly through trust rather 
than civic norms. 
I also add some governance indicators as additional controls (see Table 8), 
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and the coefficients of trust are still significantly positive and even larger than 
the ones in the Table 2. It suggests that good performance of governance 
cannot replace the role of trust in bank risk taking. Higher level of trust is 
correlated with lower risk-taking. However, civic norms may be different from 
trust. The coefficients of civic norms are smaller than the ones in the Table 2 
and become insignificant. There are some possible conditions: first, the 
coefficients of Civic are BLUE (best linear unbiased estimates). It means that 
civic norms do not play a role on bank risk taking and governance indicators 
should be included in the OLS regressions. Second, the impact of civic norms 
on bank risk taking can be replaced or influenced by governance performance, 
and Civic and governance indicators should not be included in the model at 
the same time. Third, the coefficients show insignificant just because of 
sample error I mentioned in the Chapter 4. In the countries with better 
performance of governance, people may be more willing to deny their immoral 
value orientation, which may lead the variance of the indicator of civic norms 
to become small and the coefficients of Civic to be not BLUE. Since lack of 
further evidence, it is hard to conclude the impact of civic norms on bank 
risk-taking after control governance performance. 
This chapter presents the main model and reports the empirical results. Next 
chapter will conclude this thesis and describe the limitations of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
This thesis analyzes the impact of social capital on bank risk-taking. By using 
the indicators of trust and civic norms from the data of WVS, I find that social 
capital has a positive impact on bank stability. And the coefficients of trust and 
civic norms are always significant after eliminating key country – US, 
weighted by gross assets or add some additional controls. The findings 
suggest that social capital tends to reduce the probability of bank insolvency 
and to increase the stability of banking industry. And the findings about the 
relation between bank size and bank risk are consistent with DeNicoló (2000), 
which presents that large banks don’t get size-related diversification benefits 
or economies of scale and take higher risk. 
I also find that social capital has a “dark” side as well. It tends to increase the 
percentage of NPL. The coefficient of Trust is still significant even when I 
replace CR4 to HHI as a robustness check. The findings about the relation 
between social capital and NPL also suggest that the “dark” side of social 
capital takes effect mainly by trust but not civic norms.  
Thirdly, the results of empirical analysis show that the impact of trust on bank 
risk-taking is stronger when the citizens have an averaged low level of 
education. This finding is consistent with the theory that people’s decisions 
and behaviors more rely on trust rather than technical analysis or 
sophisticated regulation when they aren’t high-educated (Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2004)).  
At last, I examine the relation between social capital of each bank’s largest 
shareholder’s country and the risk of this bank. According to the definitions of 
social capital in Coleman (1990) and Banfield (1958), I predict that the social 
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capital of bank’s shareholders’ country is not important as the one of 
registration country. The empirical results in this thesis prove my prediction as 
well. 
My findings may provide some implications for government, policy makers 
and bank managers. For government and policy makers, it is better to 
improve the level of domestic social capital, especially when the averaged 
level of education in the country is low. For bank managers, they had better 
remind themselves to avoid careless decision or overconfidence as result of 
the high level of social capital in the country from time to time. 
Of course, there are some limitations in my research. People's trust may be 
the result not only of the social capital present in their community, but also of 
prompt law enforcement. Using trust as the main indicator of social capital 
may be objected. That is one of the reason that Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004) focus on other two measures: voter turnout for referenda and blood 
donations. However, this two measures are not suitable for cross-country test. 
Meanwhile, since the indicator of social capital is collected by interview, the 
sample should face some problems. First, answers are influenced by the 
responders’ definition of trust. For this problem, my paper has already 
improved compared with the previous literature. Previous literature using the 
surveys in 1990 or 1981, and the question about trust only has two choices to 
answer: Yes or Not. My data is from 2005 surveys, and the answer has four 
levels. It helps the responders to show their real feelings about trust others. 
Second, it is difficult to test the real degree of trustworthiness of the 
respondent if the person is not trustworthy. Third, it isn’t measured on the 
entire population, so there may be some sampling error. Fourthly, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the responses about civic norms may be not so 
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reliable. The problem of the data collecting is something that I can improve in 
the further research. 
Next year, WVS will provide the newest surveys – 2010 on the internet. When 
the data open to the public, some further research can be done, such as the 
impact of social capital on bank risk-taking during the crisis.
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Appendix 
Figure 1 kernel density estimation of Z-score 
Figure 1a presents the result of kernel density estimation of raw Z-score, and figure 1b 
presents the result of kernel density estimation of the nature logarithm of Z-score. 
Figure 1a: 
 
Figure 1b: 
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Table A: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
 
Original 
sources 
Bank-level data 
Z-score Equals log of (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), 
where ROA=π/A is return on assets and 
CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio, both 
averaged over 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
Volatility of net interest 
margin 
Standard deviation of ROA of a bank, 
computed over the period 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets, 
averaged over2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
Too-big-to-fail A dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the bank's share in the country's 
total deposits exceeds 10%. 
 BankScope 
Non-performing loans 
(%) 
Non-performing loans divided by gross 
loans, in percentage, averaged over 
2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
Loan loss reserves (%) Loan loss reserves divided by gross 
loans,averaged over 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
    
Country-level data    
Trust "Trust" is the average score of responses 
in each nation replying "how much do you 
trust the people you meet for the first 
time" (after deleting no responses. For 
each response, "trust completely" equals 
to 1, “somewhat” equals to 0.67, “not very 
much” equals to 0.33, and “not trust at all” 
equals to 0. 
 World 
Value 
Survey 
(WVS) 
Civic "Civic" is the average score of responses 
in each country replying 3 questions 
about civic norms. For each question, 
respondents chose a number from 1  to 
10. I reversed these scales, and summed 
values over the three items in each 
country to create a scale (Civic) ranging 
from 3 to 30. 
 World 
Value 
Survey 
(WVS) 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, defined as 
the sum of the squared shares of bank 
deposits to gross deposits within each 
country, averaged over 2004-2006. 
 BankScope 
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Table A (continued) 
CR4 CR4 is equal to the sum of the deposits of 
the four largest banks to total deposits 
within a given country. 
 BankScope 
Log GDP per capita Log real GDP per capita, in US dollars.  WDI  
Inflation (%) Percentage inflation rate, GDP deflator.  WDI  
Diversification index Whether there are explicit, verifiable, 
quantifiable guidelines for asset 
diversification and banks are allowed to 
make loans abroad. 
 Barth, 
Caprio,and 
Levine (2006) 
Capital Regulatory Index Capital regulatory index is an index of 
regulatory oversight of bank capital. 
 Barth, 
Caprio,and 
Levine (2006) 
Official supervisory power Whether the supervisory authorities have 
the authority to take specific actions to 
prevent and correct problems. 
 Barth, 
Caprio,and 
Levine (2006) 
Provisioning stringency Provisioning stringency measures the 
minimum requirement about provisioning 
percentages. 
 Barth, 
Caprio,and 
Levine (2006) 
Deposit insurance coverage Deposit insurance coverage to deposit per 
capita. 
 Demirguc-Kunt, 
Kane, and 
Laeven (2008) 
Political stability The indicator measures the perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, 
including political violence and terrorism. 
The value of year 2005 is used. 
 Kaufmann, 
kraay, and 
Mastuzzi 
(2009) 
Quality of regulation The indicator measures the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote market competition and 
private – sector development. The value 
of year 2005 is used. 
 Kaufmann, 
kraay, and 
Mastuzzi 
(2009) 
Control of corruption The indicator measures the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests. The 
value of year 2005 is used. 
 Kaufmann, 
kraay, and 
Mastuzzi 
(2009) 
  
46 
 
Table B: List of Trust and Civic by country 
country Trust Civic country Trust Civic 
Andorra 0.3003 24.9405 Mali 0.4103 23.2757 
Argentina 0.3559 25.3563 Mexico 0.2276 21.9738 
Australia 0.4648 26.8798 Moldova 0.2349 22.9342 
Brazil 0.2129 22.6683 Morocco 0.2952 27.2625 
Britain 0.4496 26.1996 Netherlands 0.3431 27.2852 
Bulgaria 0.3265 26.1282 New Zealand 26.9909 
Burkina Faso 0.3358 25.5018 Norway 0.5585 26.3665 
Canada 0.4669 27.1228 Peru 0.1630 
Chile 0.2214 23.0208 Poland 0.3506 25.7076 
China 0.3012 25.8996 Romania 0.2509 26.5964 
Colombia 0.2357 Russia 0.2504 23.4051 
Cyprus 0.2199 26.1080 Rwanda 0.3964 26.0441 
Egypt 0.3616 27.5469 Serbia 0.3369 19.0377 
Ethiopia 0.3595 27.4191 Slovenia 0.2347 24.3958 
Finland 0.4896 26.5040 South Africa 0.3455 25.2326 
France 0.4389 24.1913 South Korea 0.2879 25.9122 
Georgia 0.3307 27.6790 Spain 0.3699 26.0158 
Germany 0.3431 26.5437 Sweden 0.5644 26.1284 
Ghana 0.2939 26.9647 Switzerland 0.4691 27.5280 
Guatemala 23.2349 Taiwan 0.3533 26.3725 
Hong Kong 26.1950 Thailand 0.2995 22.8030 
India 0.3420 23.7596 Trinidad 0.2806 25.1282 
Indonesia 0.3306 27.7448 Turkey 0.2550 28.1922 
Iran 24.7129 Ukraine 0.3018 22.6730 
Iraq Uruguay 0.3729 25.9017 
Italy 0.3102 27.1118 USA 0.4346 26.4236 
Japan 27.8927 Vietnam 0.3668 26.9087 
Jordan 0.3151 26.8428 Zambia 0.2491 22.6141 
Malaysia 0.2600 21.6958 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
Bank-level data 
Z-score 2093 3.647466 1.323589 -2.8062 2.80841 3.60044 4.37297 9.63605 
Non-performing loans (%) 1730 5.398932 11.86247 0 0.591667 1.914 5.04533 100 
Bank size 2657 12.317 2.349 4.098 10.692 12.1752 13.834 20.291 
Too-big-to-fail 2642 0.145 0.352 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 1.000 
Loan loss reserves 2240 5.823 10.327 -0.050 1.355 2.79 6.275 100.000 
Industry-level data 
HHI 13155 0.124 0.161 0.023789 0.060 0.06029 0.070 1.000 
Country-level data 
Trust 51 0.394 0.064 0.16028 0.421 0.420701 0.421 0.567 
Civic 53 24.070 1.219 14.503 24.392 24.3923 24.392 26.938 
Inflation (%) 172 5.118 5.120 -1.430 3.120 3.12 3.120 36.690 
Log GDP per capita 172 10.026 1.191 4.87 10.17 10.66 10.66 11.72 
Diversification index 136 1.778 0.432 0 2 2 2.000 2.000 
Capital regulatory index 126 6.144 0.877 3 6 6 6 10 
Official supervisory power 134 12.158 1.788 4 12 13 13 14 
Provisioning stringency 92 168.515 23.996 87 165 165 165 300 
Deposit insurance coverage 76 3.359 23.544 0.095 2.272 2.27213 2.272 453.900 
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Table 1b: correlation matrix of main regression variables - Trust 
Table 1b and table 1c report the correlations between the main regression variables. In table 1b, the indicator of social capital is Trust. And in 
table 1c, the indicator of social capital is Civic. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
  Z-score Trust Bank size 
Too big 
to fail LLR HHI Inflation 
Log 
GDP / 
capita 
Diversificatio
n index 
Capital 
regulator
y index 
Official 
supervisor
y power 
Provisionin
g 
stringency 
Trust 0.0776**            
Bank size -0.00871 0.627***           
Too big to 
fail -0.0548* -0.0219 0.239***          
LLR -0.105*** -0.200*** 
-0.186**
* 0.0545*         
HHI -0.136*** 0.201*** 0.304*** 0.421*** 0.0428        
Inflation -0.0870*** 
-0.876**
* 
-0.692**
* 
-0.168**
* 0.195*** -0.383***       
Log GDP per 
capita 0.206*** 0.726*** 0.480*** 
-0.131**
* 
-0.263**
* 
-0.0873**
* 
-0.680**
*      
Diversificatio
n index 0.103*** 0.837*** 0.539*** 
0.0870**
* 
-0.214**
* 0.108*** 
-0.818**
* 0.582***     
Capital 
regulatory 
index 
-0.164*** -0.509*** 
-0.465**
* -0.0359 0.206*** -0.178*** 0.555*** 
-0.658**
* -0.292***    
Official  
Supervisory 
power 
0.127*** 0.589*** 0.291*** -0.0155 -0.223*** -0.0306 
-0.453**
* 0.422*** 0.796*** -0.115***   
Provisioning 
stringency 0.177*** 
-0.0748*
* 0.199*** 0.0193 
-0.0691*
* -0.0658** 
-0.230**
* 0.132*** -0.0514 -0.331*** -0.250***  
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Deposit 
insurance 
coverage 
-0.0337 0.362*** 0.258*** 0.108*** -0.0454 0.247*** -0.492*** 0.274*** 0.376*** -0.192*** 0.0597* -0.186*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1c: correlation matrix of main regression variables - Civic 
  Z-score Civic Bank size 
Too big 
to fail LLR HHI Inflation 
Log 
GDP /  
capita 
Diversificatio
n index 
Capital 
regulator
y index 
Official 
supervisor
y power 
Provisionin
g 
stringency 
Civic 0.129***   
Bank size -0.00871 0.533***  
Too big to 
fail -0.0416 0.0353 0.239***          
LLR -0.108*** -0.215*** 
-0.187**
* 0.0529*         
HHI -0.127*** 0.278*** 0.303*** 0.398*** 0.0418 
Inflation -0.0925*** 
-0.778**
* 
-0.687**
* -0.154*** 0.198*** -0.382***       
Log GDP per 
capita 0.197*** 0.682*** 0.473*** -0.120*** 
-0.254**
* 
-0.0884**
* 
-0.645**
*      
Diversificatio
n index 0.111*** 0.524*** 0.529*** 0.0569* 
-0.216**
* 0.103*** 
-0.820**
* 0.533***     
Captial 
regulatory 
index 
-0.163*** -0.589*** 
-0.442**
* 0.00158 0.191*** -0.142*** 0.490*** 
-0.683**
* -0.209***    
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Official 
supervisory 
power 
0.113*** 0.405*** 0.237*** -0.0677** -0.179*** -0.0817** 
-0.311**
* 0.464*** 0.558*** -0.210***   
Provisioning 
stringency 0.174*** 0.223*** 0.200*** 0.0345 
-0.0690*
* -0.0592* 
-0.231**
* 0.128*** -0.0469 -0.329*** -0.211***  
Deposit 
insurance 
coverage 
-0.0148 0.632*** 0.261*** -0.000246 -0.0438 0.199*** 
-0.480**
* 0.331*** 0.328*** -0.181*** 0.0468 -0.179*** 
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Table 2: Main OLS regression 
These two tables present the effects of trust and civic norms on the bank risk-taking. 
The sample contains about 2000 banks across almost 20 countries. Key variables: 
trust and civic are from 2005 surveys of WVS. Dependent variable – Z-score and 
other control variables are averaged over 2004-2006. Column 1 presents OLS 
results on the effects of trust on bank risk-taking without control variables. Column 2 
presents OLS results with bank-level control variables. Column 3 presents OLS 
results with both bank-level and industry-level control variables. In Column 4, 
country-level control variables are added in the model based on Column 3. The *, ** 
and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
Table 2a: OLS regression – Trust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Trust 2.212*** 2.839*** 3.060*** 3.527* 
(5.58) (5.93) (5.79) (1.66) 
Bank size -0.0431** -0.0436** -0.0821*** 
(-2.49) (-2.51) (-3.93) 
Too big to fail -0.107 -0.0574 0.405* 
(-0.71) (-0.36) (1.70) 
LLR -0.0163*** -0.0160*** -0.00496 
(-3.80) (-3.71) (-1.13) 
HHI -0.257 0.381 
(-0.99) (0.49) 
Inflation 0.0765** 
(2.33) 
Log GDP per capita 0.252*** 
(3.49) 
Diversification index 0.164 
(0.51) 
Capital regulatory index -0.0812 
(-1.04) 
Official supervisory power 0.128*** 
(2.60) 
Provisioning stringency 0.0127*** 
(4.79) 
Deposit insurance coverage 0.379* 
(1.92) 
Adjusted R2 0.0200 0.0401 0.0401 0.1064 
N 1479 1323 1323 975 
 
  
52 
 
Table 2b: OLS regression – Civic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Civic 0.0883*** 0.115*** 0.125*** 0.105* 
(5.03) (5.56) (5.53) (1.72) 
Bank size -0.0426** -0.0420** -0.0820*** 
(-2.54) (-2.51) (-4.00) 
Too big to fail -0.115 -0.0667 0.322 
(-0.76) (-0.42) (1.44) 
LLR -0.0172*** -0.0168*** -0.00576 
(-3.99) (-3.89) (-1.31) 
HHI -0.288 0.280 
(-1.13) (0.40) 
Inflation 0.0798*** 
(3.20) 
Log GDP per capita 0.220*** 
(3.02) 
Diversification Index 1.119*** 
(3.98) 
Capital Regulatory Index -0.139* 
(-1.81) 
Official Supervisory Power -0.0361 
(-1.02) 
Provisioning Stringency 0.00844*** 
(4.81) 
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.0724 
(-0.33) 
Adjusted R2 0.0157 0.0357 0.0359 0.1004 
N 1526 1366 1366 987 
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Table 3: robustness checks: excluding US and weighted by total assets 
Table 3a examines the results of the impact of trust on Z-score excluding US values. 
Table 3b examines the results of the impact of civic norms on Z-score excluding US 
values. Table 3c examines the results of both Trust and Civic on Z-score based on 
weighted OLS regressions, and for column 3 and 4 the indicators of Trust and Civic 
aren’t weighted by WVS as another robustness check. *, ** and *** indicate the 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 3a: excluding US – Trust  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Trust 1.914*** 2.637*** 2.866*** 10.37* 
(4.15) (4.82) (4.20) (1.86) 
Bank size -0.0443** -0.0435** -0.0975*** 
(-2.28) (-2.24) (-3.93) 
Too big to fail -0.105 -0.0795 0.439* 
(-0.65) (-0.48) (1.74) 
LLR -0.0156*** -0.0156*** -0.00447 
(-3.50) (-3.49) (-1.00) 
HHI -0.177 0.951 
(-0.56) (1.08) 
Inflation 0.143** 
(2.32) 
Log GDP per capita 0.593** 
(2.21) 
Diversification index 1.006 
(1.42) 
Capital regulatory index -0.112 
(-1.37) 
Official supervisory power 0.204*** 
(2.66) 
Provisioning stringency 0.0146*** 
(4.79) 
Deposit insurance coverage 0.552** 
(2.27) 
Adjusted R2 0.0127 0.0299 0.0293 0.1026 
N 1264 1114 1114 766 
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Table 3b: excluding US – Civic  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
Civic 0.0757*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.132* 
(4.04) (4.91) (4.38) (1.74) 
Bank size -0.0535*** -0.0531*** -0.0936*** 
(-2.82) (-2.77) (-3.89) 
Too big to fail -0.0552 -0.0510 0.345 
(-0.34) (-0.31) (1.41) 
LLR -0.0156*** -0.0156*** -0.00554 
(-3.49) (-3.48) (-1.24) 
HHI -0.0347 0.409 
(-0.12) (0.57) 
Inflation 0.0821*** 
(3.09) 
Log GDP per capita 0.128 
(0.82) 
Diversification index 0.899** 
(2.09) 
Capital regulatory index -0.100 
(-0.99) 
Official supervisory power -0.0673 
(-1.11) 
Provisioning stringency 0.00939*** 
(4.16) 
Deposit insurance coverage -0.133 
(-0.56) 
Adjusted R2 0.0115 0.0300 0.0292 0.0949 
N 1311 1157 1157 778 
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Table 3c: weighted OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    Are not weighted by WVS
Trust 12.82*** 11.98*** 
(2.75) (2.72) 
Civic 0.297* 0.477* 
(1.80) (1.90) 
Bank size -0.143 -0.129 -0.142 -0.131 
(-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.26) (-1.20) 
Too big to fail 2.569*** 2.529*** 2.567*** 2.535*** 
(3.02) (3.03) (3.02) (3.03) 
LLR -0.0441 -0.0408 -0.0440 -0.0404 
(-1.21) (-1.12) (-1.21) (-1.12) 
HHI 1.463 -0.231 1.326 -0.179 
(1.28) (-0.24) (1.17) (-0.17) 
Inflation 0.195** 0.123* 0.183** 0.150** 
(2.55) (1.82) (2.47) (2.02) 
Log GDP per capita 0.715*** 0.478** 0.675*** 0.464** 
(2.86) (2.18) (2.80) (2.16) 
Diversification index 0.445 1.230* 0.351 1.228* 
(0.72) (1.72) (0.57) (1.72) 
Capital regulatory index 0.0976 -0.00267 0.0949 0.0000767 
(0.70) (-0.02) (0.68) (0.00) 
Official supervisory power -0.0545 -0.0629 -0.0539 -0.0985 
(-0.58) (-0.76) (-0.57) (-1.03) 
Provisioning stringency 0.0252*** 0.0157*** 0.0249*** 0.0150*** 
(3.37) (2.90) (3.36) (2.81) 
Deposit insurance coverage 0.749** 0.150 0.697** 0.00184 
(2.16) (0.30) (2.06) (0.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.5508 0.5496 0.5508 0.5496 
N 975 987 975 987 
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Table 4: subsample analysis – when education is low 
This table compares the coefficient from the cross country OLS regressions when the 
country level education is low than median with the coefficient of main OLS 
regression. Key variables: trust is from 2005 surveys of WVS. Dependent variable – 
Z-score and other control variables are averaged over 2004-2006. Column 1 and 3 
are the same regression in table 2. Column 2 and 4 presents OLS results when the 
country level education is low than median. Column 4 is a robustness test for Column 
2, and it didn’t use the weight from WVS. *, ** and *** indicate the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
all obs. Low edu. all obs. Low edu. 
  weighted (provided by WVS) without weight 
Trust 3.527* 4.948** 3.423* 4.761** 
(1.66) (1.98) (1.68) (1.98) 
Bank size -0.0821*** -0.0203 -0.0822*** -0.0202 
(-3.93) (-0.56) (-3.94) (-0.56) 
Too big to fail 0.405* 0.36 0.405* 0.36 
(1.7) (1.25) (1.7) (1.25) 
LLR -0.00496 -0.00611 -0.00494 -0.00612 
(-1.13) (-0.62) (-1.12) (-0.62) 
HHI 0.381 1.805 0.361 1.808 
(0.49) (1.56) (0.47) (1.56) 
Inflation 0.0765** -0.0321 0.0744** -0.0347 
(2.33) (-0.53) (2.34) (-0.57) 
Log GDP per capita 0.252*** 0.176 0.237*** 0.166 
(3.49) (1.41) (3.3) (1.32) 
Diversification index 0.164 0.573 0.14 0.552 
(0.51) (1.41) (0.44) (1.36) 
Capital regulatory index -0.0812 -0.0791 -0.0822 -0.077 
(-1.04) (-0.77) (-1.06) (-0.75) 
Official supervisory power 0.128*** -0.0124 0.128*** -0.0155 
(2.6) (-0.14) (2.6) (-0.17) 
Provisioning stringency 0.0127*** 0.00886*** 0.0128*** 0.00888***
(4.79) (2.68) (4.81) (2.69) 
Deposit insurance coverage 0.379* 0.470* 0.369* 0.463* 
(1.92) (1.73) (1.91) (1.71) 
Adjusted R2 0.1064 0.2163 0.1065 0.2163 
N 975 351 975 351 
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Table 5: OLS regression about Non-performing loan 
This table presents the relationship between social capital and non-performing loan. 
Dependent variable is the percentage of non-performing loan divided by gross loan 
averaged over 2004-2006. *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  NPL NPL NPL NPL 
Trust 22.06*** 30.33** 
(2.66) (2.56) 
Civic 0.427 0.412 
(1.55) (1.49) 
Bank size -0.399*** -0.361*** -0.405*** -0.366*** 
(-5.10) (-4.43) (-5.16) (-4.48) 
Too big to fail -0.540 -2.354** -0.546 -2.130** 
(-0.57) (-2.51) (-0.58) (-2.19) 
LLR 0.649*** 0.772*** 0.649*** 0.772*** 
(35.89) (48.81) (35.84) (48.81) 
HHI -2.725 -2.392 
(-0.77) (-0.70) 
CR4 2.653 -4.334 
(0.57) (-1.11) 
Inflation -0.800*** -0.818*** -0.527* -0.978*** 
(-4.82) (-5.86) (-1.68) (-4.25) 
Log GDP per capita -2.707*** -2.653*** -2.244*** -3.062*** 
(-9.26) (-8.59) (-3.61) (-5.64) 
Diversification index -9.148*** -4.629*** -7.777*** -5.653*** 
(-5.63) (-2.98) (-4.96) (-2.88) 
Capital regulatory index 0.435 -0.0799 0.536 -0.122 
(1.38) (-0.21) (1.47) (-0.33) 
Official supervisory power 0.729*** 0.104 0.712*** 0.0985 
(3.31) (0.71) (3.26) (0.69) 
Provisioning stringency -0.00143 -0.0232*** 0.0140 -0.0287*** 
(-0.12) (-2.74) (0.74) (-2.70) 
Deposit insurance coverage 0.344 -1.763* 1.131 -2.045* 
(0.39) (-1.75) (0.96) (-1.93) 
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.7531 0.6369 0.7533 
N 1002 1009 1002 1009 
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Table 6: social capital of shareholder country vs registration country 
This table presents the relationship between social capital of the country of the 
biggest shareholder. Dependent variable is log Z-score averaged over 2004-2006. *, 
** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
  Z-score Z-score 
Trust 0.789 
(0.60) 
Civic -0.0592 
(-0.86) 
Bank size -0.102*** -0.0997*** 
(-3.10) (-3.05) 
Too big to fail 0.297 0.278 
(0.88) (0.85) 
LLR -0.00178 -0.00246 
(-0.26) (-0.36) 
HHI -1.186 -1.155 
(-1.30) (-1.28) 
Inflation 0.000282 -0.0154 
(0.01) (-0.46) 
Log GDP per capita 0.232* 0.187 
(1.92) (1.60) 
Diversification index -0.0521 0.0764 
(-0.12) (0.17) 
Capital regulatory index -0.101 -0.133 
(-0.97) (-1.27) 
Official supervisory power 0.156** 0.143** 
(2.35) (2.34) 
Provisioning stringency 0.00259 0.00220 
(0.92) (0.82) 
Deposit insurance coverage -0.194 -0.168 
(-1.55) (-1.33) 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.0688 
N 398 397 
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Table 7:additional robustness check 
The dependent variable is log Z-score in column 1 to 6, and is non-perform loan (%) in column 7 to 10. For column 3 and 4, regressions are 
OLS for all countries excluding US. For column 5 and 6, regressions are OLS for the countries with low country-level education (less than 
median). *, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score (with low country-level edu.) NPL NPL NPL NPL 
      (excluding banks in US)   (without weight)     
Trust 3.602*   10.97*   4.991** 4.803** 21.87***   29.61** 
(1.69)   (1.93)   (2.00) (2.00) (2.61)   (2.49) 
Civic 0.106* 0.133*   0.440 0.424 
(1.73) (1.75)   (1.59) (1.54) 
Bank size squared -0.00314*** -0.00314*** -0.00403*** -0.00378*** -0.000789 -0.000787 -0.0134*** -0.0120*** -0.0136*** -0.0122*** 
(-3.63) (-3.71) (-3.60) (-3.54) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-4.19) (-3.61) (-4.25) (-3.68) 
Too big to fail 0.422* 0.338 0.476* 0.370 0.367 0.367 -0.564 -2.373** -0.570 -2.142** 
(1.75) (1.50) (1.85) (1.50) (1.27) (1.27) (-0.59) (-2.51) (-0.59) (-2.18) 
LLR -0.00470 -0.00549 -0.00423 -0.00530 -0.00607 -0.00609 0.652*** 0.775*** 0.652*** 0.775*** 
(-1.07) (-1.25) (-0.94) (-1.19) (-0.62) (-0.62) (35.97) (48.93) (35.92) (48.93) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
HHI 0.384 0.276 1.006 0.411 1.815 1.818 -2.787 -2.314 
(0.50) (0.40) (1.14) (0.57) (1.57) (1.57) (-0.78) (-0.68) 
CR4         2.348 -4.313 
        (0.50) (-1.10) 
Inflation 0.0795** 0.0825*** 0.150** 0.0840*** -0.0319 -0.0345 -0.782*** -0.791*** -0.526* -0.952*** 
(2.42) (3.32) (2.42) (3.15) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-4.69) (-5.65) (-1.67) (-4.12) 
Log GDP per capita 0.259*** 0.226*** 0.622** 0.133 0.178 0.167 -2.675*** -2.625*** -2.246*** -3.035*** 
(3.59) (3.11) (2.30) (0.85) (1.42) (1.33) (-9.10) (-8.47) (-3.60) (-5.58) 
Diversification index 0.165 1.129*** 1.058 0.899** 0.575 0.554 -9.133*** -4.496*** -7.808*** -5.537*** 
(0.52) (4.01) (1.48) (2.08) (1.41) (1.37) (-5.59) (-2.88) (-4.96) (-2.81) 
Capital regulatory index -0.0766 -0.136* -0.109 -0.0974 -0.0782 -0.0760 0.464 -0.0609 0.552 -0.102 
(-0.98) (-1.77) (-1.33) (-0.96) (-0.76) (-0.74) (1.47) (-0.16) (1.51) (-0.27) 
Official supervisory power 0.128*** -0.0363 0.209*** -0.0680 -0.0129 -0.0161 0.735*** 0.0950 0.712*** 0.0903 
(2.61) (-1.03) (2.71) (-1.12) (-0.14) (-0.18) (3.33) (0.64) (3.24) (0.63) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Provisioning stringency 0.0130*** 0.00864*** 0.0152*** 0.00966*** 0.00891*** 0.00894*** -0.000694 -0.0224*** 0.0138 -0.0279*** 
(4.86) (4.92) (4.88) (4.25) (2.70) (2.70) (-0.06) (-2.63) (0.72) (-2.62) 
Deposit insurance coverage 0.398** -0.0571 0.586** -0.117 0.474* 0.468* 0.426 -1.688* 1.164 -1.974* 
(2.01) (-0.26) (2.39) (-0.49) (1.74) (1.73) (0.48) (-1.67) (0.99) (-1.86) 
Adjusted R2 0.1044 0.0983 0.0997 0.0918 0.2165 0.2165 0.6340 0.7515 0.6338 0.7517 
N 975 987 766 778 351 351 1002 1009 1002 1009 
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Table 8: Z-score, social capital and additional controls 
*, ** and *** indicate the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trust 4.249* 4.860* 4.597* 
(1.71) (1.92) (1.81) 
Civic 0.117 0.109 0.0839 
(1.55) (1.43) (1.03) 
Bank size -0.0825*** 
-0.0788*
** 
-0.0801*
** 
-0.0824*
** 
-0.0773*
** 
-0.0781*
** 
(-3.95) (-3.74) (-3.80) (-4.01) (-3.70) (-3.73) 
Too big to fail 0.416* 0.368 0.382 0.331 0.251 0.230 
(1.74) (1.52) (1.57) (1.46) (1.07) (0.97) 
LLR -0.00509 -0.00495 -0.00440 -0.00567 -0.00522 -0.00503
(-1.15) (-1.12) (-0.99) (-1.29) (-1.18) (-1.14) 
HHI 0.623 0.918 0.777 0.216 0.274 0.275 
(0.70) (1.00) (0.84) (0.29) (0.37) (0.37) 
Inflation 0.0703** 0.0739** 0.129** 0.0896** 0.0864** 0.117** 
(2.03) (2.12) (2.53) (2.07) (2.00) (2.09) 
Log GDP per capita 0.352* 0.281 0.201 0.169 0.0553 0.0217 
(1.81) (1.38) (0.96) (0.86) (0.26) (0.10) 
Diversification index 0.262 0.340 0.694 1.111*** 0.987*** 1.220*** 
(0.72) (0.92) (1.57) (3.93) (3.30) (3.03) 
Capital regulatory index -0.0771 -0.0585 -0.0391 -0.135* -0.115 -0.0943 
(-0.98) (-0.73) (-0.48) (-1.71) (-1.44) (-1.13) 
Official supervisory 
power 0.138*** 0.0898 0.0803 -0.0493 -0.0781 -0.0825 
(2.62) (1.37) (1.22) (-0.83) (-1.23) (-1.29) 
Provisioning stringency 0.0125*** 
0.0102**
* 
0.0122**
* 
0.00877*
** 
0.00636
** 
0.00718
** 
(4.65) (3.11) (3.44) (4.15) (2.24) (2.40) 
Deposit insurance 
coverage 0.319 0.221 0.458 -0.0599 -0.126 0.0385 
(1.41) (0.92) (1.59) (-0.27) (-0.55) (0.13) 
Control of corruption -0.234 -0.621 -0.577 0.117 -0.161 -0.288 
(-0.55) (-1.17) (-1.09) (0.28) (-0.34) (-0.57) 
Regulatory quality 0.595 0.684 0.594 0.787 
(1.22) (1.39) (1.27) (1.52) 
Political stability no 
violence   0.377   0.276 
(1.48) (0.87) 
Adjusted R2 0.1058 0.1062 0.1074 0.0996 0.1001 0.0999 
N 975 975 975 987 987 987 
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